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The privatization of prisons raises important issues with respect to
liability in suits brought by inmates. If a private company operates the
prison, the state likely will be directly involved in some aspects of
prison life, such as using force when necessary or making quasi-judicial
decisions, but it may not be directly involved in the day-to-day operation of the institution. This dichotomy of involvement may lead to confusion over responsibility and accountability when a violation of rights
is alleged to have occurred.
When a private party, as opposed to a government employee, is
charged with abridging rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, the plaintiff, in order to prevail under 42 U.S.C.
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section 1983,1 must show that the private party was acting "under
color of state law"-that is, that there was state action. 2 The reason for
this is fundamental. The fifth and fourteenth amendments, which prohibit the government from denying federal constitutional rights and
which guarantee due process of law, apply to the acts of state and federal governments, and not to the acts of private parties or entities.8
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to
suit for violation of an individual's constitutional rights is whether "the
alleged infringement of federal rights [is] 'fairly attributable to the
State.' ",4 A person acts under color of state law "only when exercising
power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' "'
These concepts are crucial to prison privatization. One argument
in favor of prison privatization is that it will reduce or eliminate government liability. Yet an examination of the state action issue indicates
that this will not happen. If the state action requirement is not met,
then the private company will not be liable under the Civil Rights Act.
If the requirement is met, however, leading to the private company's
liability, then the company's costs will increase, resulting in higher
rates charged to the government. Privatization thus will be less attractive, both to the government (due to increased prices) and to investors
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part that:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
2. The constitutional standard for finding state action is closely related, if not identical, to the
statutory standard for determining "color of state law." See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982).
3. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
Throughout this article, the term "state action" refers to action at any level of government, See,

e.g., 4

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

1729 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney

eds. 1986) (explaining that the term "state action" denotes action of any "unit or element of
government"); 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
16.1, at 157 (1986) ("[A]II problems relating to the existence of government action-local, state
or federal-which would subject an individual to constitutional restriction come under the heading
of 'state action.' "); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 & n.2 (2d ed.
1988) (utilizing the term "state action" when denoting "action by any level of government, from
local to national").
4. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
5. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("[W]hen private
individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature,
").
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State . .
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(due to greater risk on their investment).
My thesis is that, in the privatization situation in which the operation of an entire institution is contracted out to private hands, there is

no doubt that state action is present. It is therefore clear that privatization will neither eliminate nor reduce the liability of the government or

the private company for violations of an individual's rights.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

The progenitors of the fourteenth amendment established the
state action requirement as a constitutional limit on the government, in

order to protect individual rights.7 Despite the framers' efforts, however, the courts over the past half century have muddled the meaning

of state action, failing to apply a consistent analysis for determining
whether it is present." Perhaps not surprisingly, the development of the

state action doctrine has depended on the composition of the United
States Supreme Court and the interests that were involved in a particular claim.9 These interests included the public expectation of equality
6. US. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
7.

See THE FEDERAUsT No. 28, at 178 (A. Hamilton) (C. Russiter ed. 1961) (stating that

federal and state governmental scheme is in place to check possible misdeeds); Id. No 46. at 294
(J. Madison) (positing that the rights reserved by the state government were designed to keep
encroachment of federal government in check); id. No. 51, at 201 (J. Madison) (arguing that
rights of citizens are protected by double security system of separate federal and state gcrernments and three distinct governmental branches on both federal and state levels); Id. No. 47, at
300 (J. Madison) (arguing that absence of separation of powers is equal to tyranny): see also
Comment, Section 1983 and the Independent Contractor,74 GEO. LJ. 457, 468 (1985) (examining constitutional limits on government and individual rights). The fourteenth amendment is also
the vehicle through which constitutional limitations restrain the states. US. Co,sr. amend XIV
(mandating certain limitations on government interference); see also Schneider, The 1982 State
Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction,Confusion, and a Proposalfor Change, 60 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 1150, 1153 (1985) (describing fourteenth amendment as limiting); Comment, supra, at
468 (arguing that fourteenth amendment serves to restrain state government as well as federal
government). In addition to the protection of federalism, state action cases also concern the competing constitutional claims of the actors. See Note, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co: Analytical Frameworkfor a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DiCm. L ReV. 315, 343 (1977)
(discussing conflict between the right to be free from governmental interference and the fourteenth amendment).
8. See, e.g., Schneider, State Action--Making Sense Out of Chaos-A HistoricalApproach,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 737, 737 (1985) (stating that Supreme Court has not been able to articulate
consistent state action doctrine).
9. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982) (no state action found for
due process claims of vocational counselor who was terminated by private school that received
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and due process, and, conversely, the right to act without federal or
state interference.1 0 Because these factors have caused inconsistencies
in the doctrine, the state action inquiry has been labelled a "paragon of
unclarity," a "protean concept," an "impossible task," ' and a "conceptual disaster area. 12
A.

HistoricalApproaches to State Action: Four Traditional Tests

In the earlier cases, courts used several analyses to determine the
existence of state action. In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,"
for example, the Supreme Court articulated a 'symbiosis test, declaring
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance." 14 It found that state action was present because a
symbiotic relationship existed between the private entity and the
state. 15 The Court emphasized that the entity-a restaurant in a buildmore than 90% of its operating budget from the state); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (finding state action where restaurant, which operated in premises leased
from an agency of the State of Delaware, refused to serve blacks during civil rights era); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (state action found because of preferred position of first
amendment where company-owned town completely barred the distribution of religious literature
on its sidewalk).
10. See Note, supra note 7, at 343 (discussing conflict between the right to be free from
governmental interference and the fourteenth amendment); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (positing question of whether due process or individual freedom ought to be held as most
important right or fundamental right).
11. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1283 n.8 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Black,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 69, 89 (1967) (stating that "eight decades of metaphysical
writhing around the 'state action' doctrine have made it the paragon of unclarity"); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 1083, 1085 (1960) (describing state action as a
"protean concept"); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formulating an infallible test for determining
what constitutes state action)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
12. Black, supra note 11, at 95.
13. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the plaintiff brought suit against a restaurant that was
located in a publicly owned and operated building and that refused to serve him on the sole basis
of his race. Id. at 716. The plaintiff claimed that the restaurant violated his rights under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
14. Id. at 722.
15. Id. at 722-26. The Court used the least restrictive state action test, finding state action
where a racially discriminatory restaurant leased space in a public parking garage. The Court
reasoned that the state and restaurant were in a position of interdependence. Id. at 725. This
interdependence theory became known as the symbiosis analysis, and was employed frequently in
state action arguments. See, e.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 289 (2d Cir.) (applying
the "symbiotic relationship" analysis enunciated in Burton), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975);
Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that, if the government so
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ing complex that included a public parking garage-was physically and

financially integrated with the public activity such that it was an indispensable part of the state's operation of the public facility."0
In Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 17 the Court discussed two
tests-the close nexus test and the public function test. The Court
stated that the inquiry under the close nexus test was whether the con-

nection between the state and the challenged action was sufficiently
close for the action to be treated as that of the state. 8 Among the

factors considered important to this analysis were state funding and
state regulation.19 Alternatively, under the public function test, the
Court required "the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."20 In Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
far insinuates itself into a position of interdependence, it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa.
1975) (concluding that the government insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
the university and that this was comparable to the symbiotic relationship present in Burton), affd,
552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977). The symbiosis analysis became so expanded that several commentators considered Burton to be an abandonment of the state action doctrine altogether. See Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L REV. 519, 533-34 (1972) (stating that several
recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate the "judicial burial" of the state action doctrine);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347, 382 (1963) (noting that the Court
in Burton "for the first time opened the door to the abandonment of the state action concept").
For the symbiosis analysis to support a state action finding, there must be a nexus between the
plaintiff's injury and the government's gain. Holodnak, 514 F.2d at 289-90. The symbiosis analysis has not been used in recent decisions, however, as the Supreme Court has moved in other
directions for state action analysis. But see infra note 160.
16. 365 US. at 723-24 (concluding that state was involved in and participated in discriminatory action because state had obligations with respect to restaurant, benefits were mutually conferred, and restaurant was integrated into building).
17. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson, the petitioner brought a section 1983 claim against a
utility that had terminated her service without providing notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to
pay amounts allegedly due. Id. at 347. The petitioner claimed that the utility's conduct constituted
state action because state law granted an entitlement to continuous electrical service and because
the termination was permitted by a provision in the utility's tariff that had been filed with the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. Id. at 347-48. The petitioner also argued that the state
granted the utility a monopoly status, which therefore supported a finding of state action. Id. at
351. She further urged that state action was present because the utility provided an essential
public service or public function. Id. at 352. Finally, the petitioner argued that there was a symbiotic relationship between the utility and state. Id. at 357. The Court rejected all of these arguments and concluded that state action was not present. Id. at 358-59.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 350. The Court discussed only the state regulation element of the close nexus test;
other cases, however, have considered the importance of state funding to the nexus analysis. See
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (analyzing state funding and regulation to
determine if there was state action). The Jackson Court noted that mere regulation was insuffident state involvement to create a close nexus. 419 U.S. at 350.
20. 419 U.S. at 352. The Court observed that the performance of a public service or public
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Brooks,2 the Court reiterated this test and noted that, although the
government traditionally performed many functions, few functions were
exclusively reserved to the state.22
A fourth test that the Supreme Court applied in its early decisions
involved state compulsion or significant encouragement. In Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co.,23 for example, the Court found that the state's com-

pulsion of the challenged conduct by a statutory provision or custom
having the force of law warranted a finding of state action. Similarly,
in Flagg Bros., the Court found no state action because the state
merely permitted the challenged conduct but did not compel it." The
compulsion test has rarely been applied alone; it is usually applied in
conjunction with another test.28
B.

The 1982 Trilogy: An Attempt at Clarification
In 1982, the Supreme Court reevaluated the state action analyses

in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"7 Blum v. Yaretsky, 28 and Rendell-

Baker v. Kohn,2 9 and attempted to articulate a clearer standard. In
Lugar, the Court fouild state action under an analysis that required the
challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.3 0 The Court
specified that conduct will be fairly attributable if it is "caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible" and if the acting party is "a person who may fairly be said
'a
to be a state actor."'

function was not enough; the function had to be traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state. Id. at 352-53.
21. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
22. Id. at 158. The Court concluded that the holding of elections is one function that traditionally has been reserved exclusively for states. The other circumstance that indicated a traditional and exclusive function was when a private corporation controlled a town and provided necessary municipal functions. Id. at 158-59 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
23. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
24. Id. at 171.
25. 436 U.S. at 164-66.
26. See Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center, 556 F. Supp. 677, 680 (D. Mass. 1983)
(combining state compulsion analysis with public function analysis), discussed infra at notes 14651 and accompanying text.
27. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
28. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
29. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
30. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The Court stated that in its previous decisions it "insisted that the
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State." Id.
31. Id. The Court further explained that a state actor is "a state official," a person who either
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In Blum and Rendell-Baker, the Court used some of the "fairly
attributable" language, 32 but concentrated on the four traditional analyses for determining state action, concluding that satisfaction of any
one of these analyses could lead to a finding of state action. 33 The
Blum Court discussed the close nexus test and noted that the relation-

ship between the challenged conduct and the state must be such that
the state was responsible for the conduct-that the state's exercise of
coercive power or significant encouragement would warrant a finding
that the state was responsible for a private decision.34 Additionally, if
the private entity performed a function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, a sufficient nexus would exist.30
The Rendell-Baker Court concluded that neither the receipt of
substantial public funds nor extensive state regulation was sufficient to
establish a close nexus. 38 The Court also stated that a fiscal relationship with the state, similar to the relationship that exists between the
state and a contractor performing services for it, was not enough to
establish state action by a symbiotic relationship, as in Burton. 7 Fi"acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials," or a person whose "conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id. According to the Court, the inquiries involving
whether the deprivation was caused by a right or privilege emanating from state authority and
whether the party charged with the deprivation was a state actor are separate issues when the
constitutional claim is directed against a party without apparent state authority. Id.
32. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (noting the fair attribution test but stating that the facts did not
support the use of this inquiry because the case did not involve the "enforcement of state laws or
regulations by state officials who are themselves parties in the lawsuit"); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
at 838 (stating that ultimate issue of whether person is subject to suit under section 1983 is
whether infringement is fairly attributable to state). The Rendell-Baker Court, however, believed
that the Blum Court used the fairly attributable analysis, id. at 839.40, and stated that, in Blum,
"[t]he Court considered whether certain nursing homes were state actors for the purpose of determining whether decisions regarding transfers of patients could be fairly attributed to the State,
and hence be subjected to Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements." Id.
33. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003-05; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 83943.
34. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
35. Id. at 1005.
36. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41. The Court expressed that "[alcts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts." Id. at 841. The Court also stated that, unless the extensive
state regulation compelled or influenced the private party's decision, the decision would not be
state action. Id. But see Schneider, supra note 7, at 1164 (stating that the nexus analysis of
Rendell-Baker is inappropriate where a state delegates a task that it is statutorily required to
provide).
37. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842-43; see also Schneider, supra note 7. at 1160 (noting that
in Rendell-Baker the Court summarily concluded that the state and the school did not share a
symbiotic relationship). At least one court has construed Rendell-Baker's discussion of the symbiotic relationship test as seriously impairing this test. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d
1278, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
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nally, the Court applied the public function analysis and concluded that
the function must belong to the state-traditionally and that legislation
providing for the state's performance of services does not render those
services within the exclusive prerogative of the state.3 8 Instead, such
legislation must explicitly state that the function may only be performed by the state in order for the "exclusive" requirement to be
satisfied.3 9
Despite the Court's attempt to clarify the state action doctrine in
this trilogy of cases, it remains unclear what set of facts will establish
state action and which analysis will be most persuasive.4 One point is
clear, however: The 1982 trilogy established a restrictive standard for
state action. 4 '
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: THE
APPLICATION TO PRISON PRIVATIZATION

Federal and state cases shed light on three of the state action analyses42-- public function, close nexus, and state compulsion-and suggest the possibility of combining all of these analyses into a fourth test
for state action. In addition, the more recent cases illustrate how the
courts have applied the holdings of the 1982 trilogy. Most important,
the recent case law can help to determine the factors that will be important to the application of the state action requirement in a private
prison context.
A. Public Function Test
The broadest application of the public function test came in 1946,
in Marsh v. Alabama.' In Marsh, the Supreme Court held the state to
be in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments when the state
enforced a privately owned town's regulation against the distribution of
38. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. The Court noted that, while the State of Massachusetts
had made a legislative policy choice to provide education to maladjusted high school students at
the public's expense, this decision in no way made these services the exclusive province of the
state. The services in question had not been traditionally provided by the state, as evidenced by
the fact that the state had only recently undertaken the service. Id.

39. Id. (the question is whether the function performed has been "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State").
40. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 1177 (opining that it is unclear whether all analyses must
now be satisfied).

41. But see id. at 1166-70 (proposing new analyses for state action, shifting focus from nexus
approach to examination of the particular nature of the challenged conduct).
42. See supra note 15 (noting demise of symbiosis analysis).
43.

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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religious literature on the streets of its business block." In making its
decision, the Court found that the private town served a public function, as if it were a municipality. 45 The public's expectation regarding
the constitutional protection of its first amendment rights was an important factor in the Court's decision.4 6 Simply because it was a privately owned town did not decrease the public expectation that the first
amendment would be protected.4
This expansive analysis was restricted by the Court's 1974 opinion
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co."' In Jackson, the Court held
that a private utility can only be characterized as performing a public
function if the activity traditionally is reserved exclusively to the
state.49 Four years later, the Court in FlaggBros. used the traditionally
exclusive notion with the public function analysis5 0 The plaintiff in
Flagg Bros. had been evicted and had her belongings placed in a private warehouse for storage.5 1 Because the plaintiff did not pay the storage costs, the warehouse threatened to sell the stored goods to satisfy
the debt.5 2 This sale was permitted pursuant to state statute.53 The
plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against the private warehouse,
alleging violation of her fourteenth amendment rights." Employing the
traditionally exclusive language in conjunction with the public function
test, the Court found that the settlement of disputes between debtors
and creditors was outside the arena of state action. 55
The Court utilized a similar analysis in Lugar, one of the three
salient public function cases decided by the Court on the same day in
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507. Thus, the Court's holding in Marsh illustrates both the public expectation and

federalism concerns that are inherent in state action litigation. Id. at 508 (the corporation "cannot
curtail the liberty of.

.

tees, and a state statute

.these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guaran. . .

which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who at-

tempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution").
47. Id. at 507. The Court stated that, "whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such a manner that the channels of communication are free." Id.
48. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
49. Id. at 352; see Comment, supra note 7, at 469 (stating that public function test vias limited in Jackson).
50. 436 U.S. at 157-61.
51. Id. at 153.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 153.
55. Id. at 161.
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1982.56 In Lugar, a debtor filed a section 1983 action against a private

creditor who had invoked a state statute permitting prejudgment attachment.57 Pursuant to this statute, the state court clerk issued a writ
of attachment and the sheriff sequestered plaintiff debtor's property.56
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that the creditor,
Edmondson Oil, acted under color of state law by using the state-created attachment process. 59 The Court posited that Flagg Bros. did not
apply, as the court of appeals had concluded, because both the state
statute and the state's direct action through its officials denoted state

action.6 0 This analysis was similar to that used in FlaggBros., although
there was no direct state action through a state official in that case."1
Unlike Lugar and Flagg Bros., which permitted a state action

finding under a compulsion or public function characterization, the
Court in Blum v. Yaretsky demanded satisfaction of the state compulsion, public function, and close nexus analyses before a claim for state
action could prevail. 2 Blum considered whether a private nursing
home's transfer decisions denoted state action when the nursing home
operated under a state contract. 3 In Blum, the plaintiffs had been
56. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, supra note 7, at 1153
(characterizing the three 1982 state action cases as a trilogy).
57. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
58. Id. at 924-25.
59. Id. Justice Powell dissented, arguing that, when a state is not responsible for a private
decision, the private action ought not to be considered state action. Id. at 949 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 942.
61. 436 U.S. at 164-65. The Court in Lugar developed a two-pronged test to determine state
action: "First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is
responsible"; and "[s]econd, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor." 457 U.S. at 937. The Lugar test was developed by comparing
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) with Flagg Bros., 457 U.S. at 937. In Moose
Lodge, a private club licensed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to serve alcohol practiced a
racially discriminatory serving policy. 407 U.S. at 171. The Court found that the government did
not in any way effect this discrimination. Id. at 175-76. Hence, regarding the first prong, the
Court in Lugar stated that government regulation does not necessarily make all private entities'
conduct state action. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
The Court then turned to Flagg Bros. to develop the second prong of its test. Id. at 938. To
be characterized as a state actor, according to Flagg Bros., one must have done something more
than act pursuant to a state statute. 436 U.S. at 164. The second prong focuses on the question of
whether a section 1983 defendant can correctly be classified as a state actor. Lugar, 457 U.S. at
941. The Lugar Court held this element to be met because the defendant received the aid of state
officials. Id. at 942.
62. The Court referred to the three state action tests as "requirements." 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
63. Id. at 1003.
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transferred to a unit rendering a lower level of care.8 They claimed

that these transfers were in violation of their fourteenth amendment
rights.

5

The Court in Blum established a three-part test to analyze
whether state action existed: There must be a close nexus between the
state and the regulated nursing home; the state must compel the private nursing home's transfer decision; and the private nursing home
must function in a manner that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. 66 Using this tripartite test, the Court held that the
transfer decisions did not constitute actions under color of state law
because the transfers were premised on independent medical standards
that the state did not establish.67
Neither Blum nor Lugar involved the delegation of activities that
the state is normally obliged to perform. Because Rendell-Baker, however, did involve such a delegation, and because its outcome is at odds
with the public expectation of the state's responsibility," it has an impact on state action analysis with respect to the privatization of state
functions-the privatization of prisons, for example."D In fact, RendellBaker is the most relevant Supreme Court privatization case to date
that involves state action.70 This case concerned a privately owned, leg64. Id. at 995. The Court did not permit the challenge of transfers to a higher level of care.
Id. at 1002.

65. Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed that they had not been afforded adequate notice of the transfer decisions and the reasons supporting them or of their right to an administrative
hearing to challenge those decisions. Id. at 996.
66. Id. at 1004-05.
67. Id. at 1012. The Court in Blum compared the independent professional standards relevant

to its holding to the adverse relationship that the lawyer has with the state due to the lawyer-client
relationship. Id. at 1008-09. The Court addressed the adverse lawyer-state relationship in Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the Court held that a public defender's
activities or functions did not constitute state action because the state had not developed the professional standards that govern a lawyer's conduct. Id. at 321-22. The Court's reference to Polk
County in Blum is interesting, because the Court in Polk County contrasted the functions of the
legal and medical professions. Id. at 320. The legal profession, as described in Polk County, is in

place to ensure protection from harmful state action, whereas the medical profession, when institutional, assumes the same obligation and mission as does the state. Id.
68. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 1167-69 (delineating role of public expectation for finding
of state action in privatization cases).
69. Privatization cases involve at least two sets of interests: the aggrieved party's civil rights,

and the private defendant's interest in freedom from governmental intervention.
70. See also West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 256
(1987), discussed infra at note 84. Rendell-Baker presented two cases that were consolidated on
appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consolidated the cases after

interlocutory appeal had been granted to the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981), afid, 457 U.S 830 (1982).
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islatively established institution for maladjusted high school students.7"
A vocational counselor at the school filed a claim under section 1983
after being dismissed for supporting a student petition. 71 In a consolidated appeal of differing district court judgments, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ordered dismissal of the claim
because the school did not act pursuant to color of state law in its termination decision. 73 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, using
the public function and close nexus tests together for the first time. 4
The Court conceded that special education was a public function
that state law delegated to a private entity, but the question remained
whether special education was the traditional and exclusive prerogative
of the state.75 The Court held that the state delegation statute, as well
as the school's public function, were not enough to prove that special
education was an exclusive state prerogative. 76
The requirement of an exclusive state prerogative was first applied

to the public function test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,71
reflecting the concern of increasing litigation under section 1983.78 In
Jackson, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against a monopo71. 457 U.S. at 834-35. Massachusetts law imposed responsibility on the state to provide special education. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, §§ 3, 4 (West Supp. 1981). This same statute
permitted the delegation of special education to private schools. Id. § 3. The delegation statute
also required extensive regulation, including periodic reviews of each student's progress, specific
education programs for each student, and reviews of the original placement decision. Id. The New
Perspectives School that was involved in Rendell-Baker received ninety to ninety-nine percent of
its budget from public funds because of the large number of students placed there pursuant to the
Massachusetts delegation statute. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832. But the Court concluded that
dependence on public funding did not make the private acts public. Id. at 840.
72. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 834. The counselor, Rendell-Bakcr, requested a hearing or
reinstatement. The school decided to appoint a grievance committee to consider her claims. Id.
Several months later, five other teachers were dismissed due to their public statements regarding
New Perspectives' educational environment and the students' rights to free speech. Id, at 835. The
five teachers also brought suit pursuant to section 1983. Id.
73. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1981), arfd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
74. 457 U.S. at 840-43. The Court in Rendell-Baker found that the fourteenth amendment
and section 1983 were functionally similar. Id. at 838. This finding is to be distinguished from
Lugar, in which the Court cautiously stated the differences between the two. Lugar, 457 U.S. at
927-28 & n.8.
75. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
76. Id. at 841-42. Using the exclusivity clause imposed in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974), the Court thus limited the public function doctrine.
77. 419 U.S. at 352.
78. Compare ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 135, at table 15 (reporting 19,735 civil rights cases) with ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 232, at
table C2 (reporting only 280 civil rights cases), cited in Comment, supra note 7, at 457.
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listic private utility, claiming a violation of due process because service
to her home had been terminated for failure to pay.7 0 Under the test
formulated by the Court, the plaintiff could prevail if the utility functioned in a fashion traditionally and exclusively reserved for the state.80
Plaintiff's claim failed because the Court held the utility provision to be
neither the traditional nor the exclusive function of the government. 81
Given its reliance on the Jackson holding, Rendell-Baker built
upon the Jackson exclusivity test, which required that the delegated
function be traditionally provided by the state.8 2 Yet the Massachusetts
delegation statute, as well as the huge public school system, tended to
show that the provision of education was a traditional state function.
Nevertheless, the requirement of exclusivity in Rendell-Baker was said
to follow from the Jackson decision.
Ignoring Jackson's requirement that a delegation of a traditional
government function be found before applying the exclusive state action test, the Rendell-Baker Court couched the issue as whether a private school with public funding and regulation, when terminating employees, acts under color of state law. 83 Given the statutory duty to
provide special education, if the state had provided the service itself it
would not be permitted to act outside the limits of the Constitution.
The state should not be permitted to distance itself from its traditional
and statutory duties through privatization.
Although cases in state courts and lower federal courts have addressed state action and the public function analysis,4 the number of
79. 419 U.S. at 347-48.
80. Id. at 353.

81. Id. Nevertheless, it is clear that Jackson did not intend the exclusivity limitation to apply
whenever the public function test is used. Id.
82. Id.
83. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840.
84. Compare Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that private health care provider to county jail may be liable under section 1983 for inadequate medical services to prisoners) and Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (1 Ith Cir. 1986)
(physician who contracts with state to provide medical care to inmates acts under color of state

law) with Calvert v. Sharp. 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no state action where doctor
merely cared for patients without a supervisory function or dependence on state funds), cert. denied, 471 U.S 1132 (1985).
In a 1987 en banc decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to overrule Calvert. West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 994-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (7-3
vote) (holding that physician who was under contract to provide orthopedic services to inmates at
a state prison hospital did not act under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when he
allegedly provided inadequate medical treatment to prisoner). The United State Supreme Court
granted certiorari in West. 108 S. Ct. 256 (1987). The case was argued on March 28, 1988. In an

interesting question that may portend the Court's direction in the case, Justice Blackmun asked
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these cases diminishes considerably when limited to the privatization
issue involved in Rendell-Baker. The most pertinent post-RendellBaker federal case regarding privatization, especially of prisons, is Medina v. O'Neill.85 The federal district court in Medina considered the
issue of whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
was liable under state action theory after it had contracted for the incarceration of undocumented workers with a private detention corporation. 86 Prior to deportation, sixteen Colombian inmates were incarcerated by that corporation for the INS.87 After recapturing the prisoners
following an escape attempt, a private guard, untrained in the proper
use of firearms, was using his shotgun as a prod when it discharged,
killing one of the detained aliens and wounding another." The plaintiffs claimed, pursuant to section 1983, that they had been unconstitutionally deprived of due process and subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment. 89 They argued that state action existed because the INS
had a duty to monitor their detention and had failed in this duty. The
INS responded that there was no state action because the detained
aliens were at all times in the custody of the private detention
corporation."
The court held for the plaintiffs, finding "obvious state action" on
the part of both the INS and the private company.91 The court noted
2
that, although there was no precise formula for finding state action,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the public function concept includes whether the function performed has been traditionally the excluthe North Carolina Special Deputy Attorney General who was arguing the case for the respondent doctor why, if there was no state action, was the Attorney General's office representing Dr.
Atkins.

If the Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit, finding state action in the situation in
which the medical services of a state prison had been contracted out, then state action would
certainly exist in a situation involving a private prison or jail. Even if the Supreme Court were to
find no state action, however, such a conclusion would not likely control a case in which the entire
operation of the prison or jail had been contracted out.
85. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), vacated in part & rev'd in part on other grounds,

838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). Because the government in Medina had control over the prison
conditions, a close nexus analysis could also have been employed despite the fact that the detention facility was privately operated.
86. Id. at 1038; see supra note 3 (noting that state action analysis applies to actions of federal
government).
87. 589 F. Supp. at 1031 n.6.
88. Id. at 1032 n.8.
89. Id. at 1038.

90.

Id.

91.
92.

Id.
Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).

PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS

1988]

sive prerogative of the state. 3 The court in Medina then stated:
"[D]etention is a power reserved to the government, and is an exclusive
prerogative of the state . . . [Thus,] it is evident that the actions of
all the defendants were state action within the purview of the public
function doctrine."'"
Indicative of most state cases involving state action is Rathbun v.
Starr Commonwealth for Boys.95 Like Rendell-Baker and Medina,
Rathbun is a privatization case.90 In Rathbun, the plaintiff was an employee of a private institution that housed boys in the custody of the
Michigan Department of Social Services. 7 Because the plaintiff had
been raped by one of the detained residents, she brought suit against
the Department of Social Services under section 1983. 3 The Michigan
Court of Appeals stated that a private entity acted under color of state
law pursuant to section 1983 when it performed a function that is essentially and traditionally public.99
This standard is obviously similar to the public function analysis
employed in Rendell-Baker and Medina. Unlike Rendell-Baker, but
just as in Medina, the Rathbun court found state action. The Rathbun
holding is bothersome, however, because its fact pattern is much closer
to Rendell-Baker than it is to Medina. But Rathbun and RendellBaker can be distinguished in that the facility in Rendell-Baker was
primarily used for education. Education under Rendell-Baker was not
an exclusive public function, whereas the Rathbun facility was only
concerned with detention, a traditional and exclusive public function.
A distillation of these cases thus leads to the conclusion that the
conduct of those who operate private prisons will be held to constitute
state action under the public function test.
B.

Close Nexus Test

The Burger Court primarily applied the close nexus test during its
earlier years, perpetuating the prior Court's expansive view of the state
action doctrine; the Court now uses this test much less frequently."' 0
93. Id. (citing Blum, 457 US. at 1011; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842; and Jackson, 419
U.S. at 353).
94. Id. at 1038-39.
95. 145 Mich. App. 303, 377 N.W.2d 872 (1985).
96. Id. at 312, 377 N.W.2d at 877.
97. Id. at 307, 377 N.W.2d at 874.

98. Id. at 308, 377 N.W.2d at 875.
99. Id. at 312, 377 N.W.2d at 877.
100. Schneider, supra note 8, at 760. The close nexus test is an "expansive approach to state
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State action is found under this test if a substantial connection or nexus
is established between the state and the private entity's challenged actions.101 The critical question is whether the private party's challenged
action can be treated as that of the state. 10 2 Courts usually examine the
extent of the state's funding and regulation of the private entity to determine if the required nexus is present.21 Although the determination
of state action in a private prison context will turn on the facts of each
case, the trend in the courts may shed light on what is required.
Recently, state action has not been found under a pure close nexus
test based on factors such as state funding and regulation; courts have
considered other factors important and have used the nexus language in
connection with other tests.1° The best example of the use of the close
nexus test is in Milonas v. Williams.0 " In this case, former students
brought a section 1983 claim against a private residential school for
youths with behavioral problems, alleging that the school's behavior
modification program violated their constitutional rights2 °0 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school administrators, acting under
color of state law, had caused them to be subjected to antitherapeutic
and inhumane treatment, resulting in violations of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 7 The court found that there was
significant state regulation of the school's educational program and
action, which was acceptable in the context of racial discrimination, [but] was not as desirable in
subsequent cases where race was not a factor." Id. at 741. The decrease in racial discrimination
litigation explains the Burger Court's shift from reliance on this test to more restrictive tests.
101. Id. at 760 n.152. This source further states that the Burger Court used the nexus test to
"replace the cumulative totality approach of Burton." Id. It may be argued, however, that the
Burger Court, and recent federal district and appellate courts, have returned to the use of a totality approach to state action, combining the exclusive public function test, the state compulsion
test, and the close nexus test. See, e.g., Bium, 457 U.S. at 1004-05 (stating that the required
nexus is present if the state is responsible for conduct because the conduct has a sufficiently close
nexus with the state, if there is evidence of the state's exercise of coercive power or significant
encouragement, or if a private party exercises power that traditionally and exclusively has been
that of state); Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1284-88 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing
nexus, public function, and encouragement analyses), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); Thorn
v. County of Monroe, 586 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-93 (M.D. Pa.) (analyzing facts under various tests
for state action), affd, 745 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1984).
102. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Woodall v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (using nexus
language but public function test).
105. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id.
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substantial state funding of its students' tuition."0 8 According to the
court, however, the critical factor was that the state, through juvenile

courts and other state agencies, placed the students at the school without the students' consent.109 The court therefore concluded that state
action was present because the facts established a close nexus between
the state and the conduct of the school and school officials.11 0
111 a case
Similarly, state action was found in Woodall v. Partilla,
involving a former inmate's labor claims against a private corporation
that provided food service at a prison.1 2 The Illinois Department of
Corrections had contracted with a private food service corporation to
108. Id. at 940.
109. Id. It was on this ground that the court distinguished Rendell-Baker. Rendell-Baker involved a private school's allegedly wrongful termination of an employee. 457 U.S. at 834. The
United States Supreme Court found no state action sufficient to support a section 1983 claim,
although there was state funding and regulation. Id. at 840-43. The involuntary nature of the
placement of students at the school in Milonas and the fact that Milonas involved students, and
not employees, allowed the court in Milonas to find that Rendell-Baker was not controlling. 691
F.2d at 940; see also Schneider, supra note 8, at 742 n.27 (discussing Afilonas and distinguishing
it from Rendell-Baker).
110. 691 F.2d at 939 ("[T]he state ha[d] so insinuated itself with the (school) as to be considered a joint participant in the offending actions."); see also Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens
v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (upholding mentally retarded citizens' class
action under section 1983 against privately operated residential facility and concluding that sufficient relationship existed between state and facility because state substantially funded facility and
facility undertook duties traditionally within province of state), affd, 674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982).
111. 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
112. Id. at 1069. The plaintiff joined another claim against the private corporation, one of its
employees, and certain prison officials, alleging that disciplinary proceedings that had been
brought against the inmate by an employee of the private corporation violated his constitutional
rights. Id. at 1070. The court concluded that the private corporation's employee did not act under
color of state law for the purpose of that claim, and that, as to the other defendants, no cause of
action was stated concerning authorization of the disciplinary action. Id. at 1072-73. Therefore,
state action did not exist with respect to any party's conduct regarding the disciplinary claim. Id.
This part of the holding in Woodall may be incorrect. The inmate complained about the
conduct of an employee of the private corporation, or, as the court suggested, "a non-employee of
the state," whose conduct was "analogous to that of a private citizen who acts as complainant in a
criminal prosecution." Id. at 1071. Thus, the court's conclusion would serve to immunize the conduct of all employees of private corporations that contract with the state to provide a state function. The employee in this case was not acting as a private citizen. Her conduct instead was the
product of work-related circumstances, and the work that was to be done--supplying food service-was a function that the state was obligated to provide. If the state had not contracted out its
obligation, the employee would have been an employee of the state, and the conduct would have
been state action. The state does not shed its responsibility for such conduct just because it contracts with a private party. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1287 n.20 (5th Cir.
1985) (noting that states cannot avoid constitutional obligations by delegating to private entities).
cert. denied, 476 U.S 1142 (1986); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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prepare food for the prison using inmate labor.11 The plaintiff alleged
that his federal and state constitutional rights had been violated because he worked for the food service in excess of the number of hours
and below the wage level required by law. 1 4 The court analyzed the
question of whether the private food service acted under color of state
law in order to support the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.1 15 It concluded that the requisite close nexus did exist between the state and the
private corporation because the corporation paid the inmate's wages,
directed the inmate's work, and compelled the inmate to work allegedly
excessive hours."1 ' Therefore, the corporation exercised a typically state
because there was a sufficient
power and state action was established
117
complaint.
the
in
nexus alleged
In the event that such a claim is brought against a private prison
that contracted with the state for operation of an entire institution, and
not just for provision of a single service, these cases strongly suggest
that state action would be found under a close nexus analysis. A privately operated prison would be significantly funded and regulated by
the state or federal government. In addition, state and federal courts
would place prisoners at such prisons. Moreover, courts using the nexus
language, but applying the public function test, may find a close nexus
because the private entity, in operating the prison, would wield a typically state power, as in Woodall.
Several recent cases, however, have not found state action under a
close nexus test, even when the governmental involvement was almost
as apparent as it would be in the private prison context. In Graves v.
Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc.,"18 for example, an inmate brought a
section 1983 claim against a halfway house for improper treatment of
his drug addiction. A private nonprofit corporation operated the halfway house, which served as a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility
and employment facilitator for federal and state inmates.1 1 The federal district court determined that the halfway house was subject to
state regulation because it was required to have the certification of the
Department of Mental Health before it was entitled to receive state
113.
114.
115.
116.

581 F. Supp. at 1076.
Id.
Id.
Id.

117.

Id. Although the court believed that the allegations gave rise to a finding of state action,

the labor claims were determined to be without merit. Id. at 1077-78.
118. 605 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
119. Id.at 1286.
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referrals. 12 ° The halfway house also received substantial funding from
both the state and federal governments: the federal government reimbursed the halfway house for all of the costs incurred in treating federal inmates and the state paid ninety percent of the costs for state
inmates.1 21 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff did not allege
sufficient facts to establish state action and support a claim under section 1983.12
In a short opinion, the court examined the analyses in RendellBaker and Blum and concluded that public funding and regulation
were insufficient factors to establish a close nexus.1 2 3 The court interpreted the two cases to mean that the close nexus must exist between
the state and the challenged activity, and not just the actor. 12 ' Since
there were no facts in Graves alleging that the government was involved in the treatment policy or detoxification program, there was thus
no nexus between the state and the challenged activity.12
Other courts have reached a similar result under equally compelling facts. In Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program,20 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no state
action under the close nexus standard. In this case, a former director of
a community action agency, organized as a private nonprofit corporation, brought a section 1983 claim against the agency, challenging his
termination.12 7 The plaintiff claimed that the termination decision constituted state action because there was extensive state involvement in
creating, funding, operating, and regulating the agency.1 28 The court
noted that, in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
state funding and regulation were not enough to establish state
120. Id.
121.

Id. In addition, the state reimbursed the halfway house for sixty percent of the costs

of

treating non-inmate patients. Id.
122. Id. at 1287.
123. Id. The Graves court compared the halfway house to the private school in Rendell-Baker
and the nursing home in Blum, both of which had been publicly funded and regulated. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 710 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 632-35. Gilmore also alleged that he was deprived of a property interest without
due process of law and that the termination constituted government action. Id. at 633. He asserted

that government action was established because of significant federal funding and regulation. Id.
at 636. The court analyzed this issue separately from the state action issue and concluded that
these factors, in the absence of others, were insufficient to establish government action. Id. The
court found particularly important the fact that the federal government did not exercise influence
or control over the agency's employment decisions. Id.
128. Id. at 635.
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action.129
The plaintiff, however, stated that other factors supported a finding of state action. For example, state officials substantially participated in the creation of the agency and the state chose to designate the
agency as a private organization rather than as a public organization or
a political subdivision.130 More significantly, one-third of the agency's
governing board was composed of local public officials who were extensively involved in operating the agency and who had veto power over
the agency's programs.131 These facts, according to the court, warranted a finding that the agency was a state actor but did not necessarily mean that the conduct was state action. 3 2
The court applied the two-part test established in Lugar, requiring
that there be a state actor and that the challenged activity be state
action. 33 Although the agency was a state actor, the court concluded
that the termination decision did not result from "the exercise of a
right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority.""' The court determined that no facts established that the
agency's personnel decisions were a product of state policy or decision,
even though members of the governing board were public officials.185
Gilmore represents a trend in the courts that sets an extremely
high standard for state action. Not only must the state fund and regulate an entity, but it must also have a policy governing the challenged
decision or conduct; state action will not be established if the state
merely has officials participating in the decision-making process.13 0
129. Id. at 637. The court reviewed Rendell-Baker and Blum before reaching its conclusion.
Id. at 636.
130. Id. at 637.

131.

Id. (indicating that the board members who were public officials offered services and

assisted the agency and were not merely acting in an "honorary or figurehead capacity").
132. Id. at 638-39. The Gilmore court recognized that not all of the actions of state actors are
state actions. Id.
133. Id. at 637. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, for the appropriate analytical framework for

assessing the relevance of involvement by public officials in nominally private activities.
134.
135.

710 F.2d at 638.
Id. at 638-39; see also Krieger v. Bethesda-Chevy Chase Rescue Squad, 599 F. Supp.

770, 774 (D. Md. 1984) (noting that public official's mere participation in private affairs does not
make entity the state; rather, there must be nexus between capacity as official and challenged
activity), affd, 792 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1986).
136. This case may not be representative of the courts' position on state action, but rather

may indicate the direction in which the courts are moving. See Thorn v. County of Monroe, 586
F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (M.D. Pa.) (holding no state action for private corporation operating
nursing home that terminated nurses, despite facts that public officials were on nursing home
board, state regulation existed, and county previously owned home), af/'d, 745 F.2d 48 (3d Cir.
1984). But see Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 940 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding state action
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Furthermore, the strict standards established by the holdings in
Graves and Gilmore imply that it may be difficult to establish state
action in a private prison context. This is probably a false implication,
however, because a claim that is brought in a private prison context
can be distinguished from both Graves and Gilmore in several ways.
First, the funding and regulation in the private prison context will exceed the funding and regulation that were present in either Graves or
Gilmore. The state or federal government will substantially, if not totally, fund a privately operated prison. The government will retain its
responsibility for the treatment, physical environment, and duration of
confinement of the inmates; therefore, the government will extensively
regulate the private prison. Second, unlike the situations in Graves and
Gilmore, the government will have policies governing various aspects of
prison operations, conditions, and the treatment of inmates because it is
the state that is ultimately obligated to protect these aspects of prison
life. Third, also unlike the situations in Graves and Gilmore, the defendant entity will be a for-profit company, thus raising important
questions of accountability. Fourth, the government will retain exclusive control over the placement of inmates in private prisons. These
factors, taken together, indicate that Graves and Gilmore are not controlling. Even if they were, however, a private prison case will be strong
enough to establish state action under a stricter test.
Therefore, under the traditional two-factor close nexus test, the
private prison company will be a state actor and its operations will constitute state action. The two-factor test, however, probably will not be
used frequently in the future. Additional factors will be required, such
as the state's placement of prisoners at the prison and a significant
state role in overseeing certain policies and management of the prison.
C. State Compulsion Test
In addition to using the public function and close nexus tests,
many courts have recognized that state compulsion or significant encouragement is an important factor in the state action analysis.""7 Few
courts, however, have applied the state compulsion test as the sole debased on state funding, regulation, and placement of students at private schools), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1069 (1983).
137. The United States Supreme Court has articulated that "a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; see also supra notes 23-25 & 34 and accompanying text.
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terminant.1 38 In fact, the infrequency of the use of this analysis indicates that state compulsion is difficult to establish and that only in a
rare case will this analysis alone support a finding of state action.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.139 is one such case. In Adickes, a
white woman brought a section 1983 claim against a private party for
refusing to serve her in its lunchroom, allegedly because she was accompanied by blacks, and for conspiring with local police who arrested
her for vagrancy on the private party's premises after the incident. 4 °
The United States Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth
amendment, while clearly prohibiting the state from discriminating, did
not prohibit a private party from discriminating on the basis of race
unless that party acted "against a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement." 114 1 The Court believed, however, that the fourteenth
amendment was offended if the state, by its law, compelled the private
party to discriminate on the basis of race.14 2 The state action requirement was satisfied whether the state compelled a private party's racially discriminatory act by statute or "by a custom having the force of
law."14 3 The Court concluded that state action was present because the
police, as state officials, gave the discriminatory custom the force of law
14
when they arrested the claimant. 4
A state compulsion analysis may readily be applied in the private
prison context as well. For example, if the private entity engages in
conduct that may be challenged as cruel and unusual punishment as a
result of the state setting unreasonably high standards to govern how
the entity may treat prisoners, 45 it may be argued that the state has
significantly encouraged or compelled the activity. If the facts are suffi138. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (indicating that state action
is present when state compels act); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
139. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
140. Id. at 146.
141. Id. at 169.
142. Id. at 171 (state may not discriminate on the basis of race "' by direct action or through
the medium of others who are under State compulsion to do so' ") (quoting with emphasis Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1961)).
143. Id.

144. Id. at 172. The Court hypothesized that it could be established that the police gave the
discriminatory act the force of law because they made a false arrest of the claimant to harass her
for attempting to eat with blacks or because they tolerated the threats of violence against those
who violated the segregation custom. Id.
145. It is unlikely, of course, that the state's standards would be impossible to meet. But they
might be set at a higher level for private prisons than for public prisons to assure accountability

and to hold private prison companies to their word that they can do a better job than the govern.
ment can at managing prisons and jails.
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ciently persuasive, this may be all that is necessary to establish state
action.
Recent case law, however, indicates that state compulsion will be
considered in conjunction with other factors. In Lombard v. Eunice
Kennedy Shriver Center,14 for example, the federal district court discussed the state compulsion analysis but ultimately relied on the public
function test. In this case, the plaintiff, an involuntary resident at a
state mental institution, brought a section 1983 claim alleging that he
had received inadequate medical care from a private organization that
had contracted with the institution to provide medical services.
In
determining whether state action was present to support the claim, the
court recognized that the state must compel the act and that "[a] private party's action or decision must be required by a rule of decision
imposed by the state before that action or decision will be deemed state
action. 14 8 Yet the court also noted that state compulsion would not be
required for a finding of state action if the private party performed a
traditional and exclusive public function . 49 Here, the court considered
it decisive that the state had an affirmative duty to provide adequate
medical services for involuntarily committed residents of a state institution. 50 Since the state delegated this duty, the private organization assumed a public function; thus the court found that its acts constituted
146. 556 F. Supp. 677 (D. Mass. 1983).
147. Id. at 678.
148. Id. at 679.
149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. "The critical factor in our decision is the duty of the state to provide adequate medi-

cal services to those whose personal freedom is restricted because they reside in state institutions."
Id. at 678. In a statement that virtually summarizes the experiences of the courts on the question
of whether the acts of private entities performing functions that are delegated by the state constitute state action, the court added:
[I]t would be empty formalism to treat the [private entity] as anything but the equivalent
of a governmental agency for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether a physician is
directly on the state payroll. . . or paid indirectly by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the trilateral relationship among the state, the private defendant, and the plaintiff.
Because the state bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to
plaintiff, because the state delegated that function to the [private corporation], and because [that corporation] voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract, [the private entity] must be considered to have acted under color of law, and its acts and omissions must
be considered actions of the state. For if [the private entity] were not held so responsible,
the state could avoid its constitutional obligations simply by delegating governmental
functions to private entities.
Id. at 680. But see West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.) (en bane). cert. granted. 108 S. Ct.
256 (1987), discussed supra at note 84.
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state action. 51
Lombard indicates that, in the state action determination, evidence of state compulsion carries equal, if not greater, weight than that
which is accorded to the performance of a public function. Although
state compulsion or encouragement may be difficult to prove if the state
does not exercise it through a written law, the courts have left open the
possibility that the coercion or encouragement of a decision may be
exercised overtly or covertly. This analysis can have major importance
in the privatization area, in which the state will likely retain a significant oversight function.
D.

Multi-CharacterizationAnalysis

The current state action analysis, which combines the several tests,
has been most clearly articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Frazier v. Board of Trustees.0 2 No state
action was found in this case, in which a discharged employee of a
private corporation that provided respiratory therapy services for a
county hospital brought a section 1983 claim against the hospital for
violating her free speech, due process, and equal protection rights.'03
Although the court described the state action question as a "paragon of
unclarity," a "protean concept," and an "impossible task,"10' it believed that its path was "relatively well-marked" based on the instruction of Rendell-Baker and Blum.15 5 The court stated that the critical
inquiry was whether "the alleged infringement of federal rights [was]
'fairly attributable to the state . ...
The court reviewed the case law and found several factors to be
important to a state action analysis. It first recognized that the state's
financial involvement and regulation, although significant, were not
enough to create a sufficiently close relationship between the hospital's
conduct and the state.157 The court also found that the performance of
151.

556 F. Supp. at 678, 680.

152. 765 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
153. Id. at 1288.
154. Id. at 1283 & n.8; see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
155. 765 F.2d at 1283-84.

156.

Id. at 1283. This test originated in Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see supra notes 30-31 and

accompanying text.

157. 765 F.2d at 1285. The Court examined Rendell-Baker and Blum for this result. It concluded that state funding did not make a private personnel decision state action and that general
regulation was not enough-the regulation must control the challenged decision before state action can be found. Id.
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a traditional and exclusive state function and the joint participation or
symbiosis between the state and the hospital were important, but dismissed both factors with respect to the facts of the case.lee According
to the court, "only when the state has had some affirmative role, albeit
one of encouragement short of compulsion, in the particular conduct
underlying a claimant's civil rights grievance," will private conduct be
fairly attributable to the state.'1 9 The state in this case played no such
role.160
Frazierindicates that the state's funding, regulation, delegation of
a public function, and symbiosis will be factors that warrant consideration in the state action analysis, but that the crucial factor is whether
the state was involved in, encouraged, or compelled the challenged conduct or decision.' 61 Under this analysis, the claim against a private
prison will be supported by state action. To determine whether a nexus
exists, a court should consider that the private prison would be substan158. Id. at 1286-87. The court discussed the public function theory and inferred that the
Rendell-Baker Court required the delegation of a function before state action could be found. Id.
at 1285. Applying the test to its own facts, the Frazier court concluded that respiratory therapy
was not "an activity that has traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state." Id. at 1286.
The court considered the joint participation/symbiosis theory the best argument for state
action in this case. In light of Rendell-Baker and Blum, however, the court did not feel that this
theory, as developed in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), had as much
weight as it once had. In fact, it stated that "[t]he 'joint' of 1961 does not the 'symbiosis' of today
make." 765 F.2d at 1287; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court
used the joint participation analysis and found that the private corporation was located on the
hospital's premises, that the hospital paid for the utilities and supplied equipment, and that it
profited from the services that the private corporation provided. 765 F.2d at 1287. The court
concluded that the core of the relationship was missing-the state did not play "some meaningful
role in the mechanism leading to the disputed act." Id. at 1288 (footnote omitted). Therefore,
there was no symbiotic relationship. Id.
159. 765 F.2d at 1286 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US. 163, 173, 176-77
(1972)).
160. Id. at 1288. The Supreme Court recently used a similar, albeit cursory, anaisis in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2984-87
(1987). The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the Olympic Committee's enforccment of the use of
the word "Olympic," under a charter granted to it by Congress, was discriminatory in violation of
the fifth amendment. Id. at 2984. Rejecting this challenge, a majority of the Court (5-4 vote on
this issue) utilized the close nexus test, the public function test, the state compulsion test, and the
symbiosis test. Id. at 2984-87.
161. See Comment, supra note 7, at 479 ("All of these traditional factors converge on the
common goal of discovering when private exercise of power presents the unique danger to individual liberty posed by the exercise of governmental power."); see also Watkins v. Reed, 557 F.
Supp. 278, 281 & n.9 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (suggesting the factors that Blum and Rendell-Baker
deemed important included state regulation, state financial assistance, symbiotic relationship, performance of traditional and exclusive public function, and state coercion or encouragement), affd,
734 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1984).
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tially, if not totally, state funded and state regulated. It should also
analyze the state policies or regulations, if any, governing the challenged conduct. In addition, the operation of a prison is traditionally
and exclusively a function of the state, and thus the state delegation 1of
02
this task to a private entity would satisfy a public function analysis.
Furthermore, in the event that the state furnishes the prison facilities
for the private entity and retains ownership over the land and equipment, thereby remaining integrated with the prison, a court should find
a symbiotic relationship. The establishment of any of these factors will
be considered significant to the state action determination.
State action will not be found under a multi-characterization analysis unless the government specifically participated in the challenged
conduct. Although direct participation may not be a frequent occurrence in the privatization context, this point will probably not be difficult to establish. The claims that inmates typically bring against the
government involve infringement of rights that the government plays a
major role in protecting; consequently, the government controls or at
least participates in the challenged conduct.16 3 The conditions of the
prison"" and the treatment of prisoners,1 65 for example, are obligations
162. The court in Fraziernoted that, if the state delegated its obligations in an attempt to
avoid its constitutional responsibilities, such a "sham delegation of state tasks would clearly implicate both the state action and the under-color-of-law requirements of section 1983." 765 F.2d at
1287 n.20. Furthermore, "[i]f the state is allowed to delegate its responsibility,. . . those persons
who exercise governmental power are shielded, at least partially, from political safeguards and

political accountability." Comment, supra note 7, at 477 (footnote omitted). This point is particularly significant with respect to the development of private prisons, because one argument is that
states can avoid liability by delegating their obligation to maintain and operate prisons. Privatization of Corrections: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 24 (1985 &
1986) (statement of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees).
163. This statement is too obvious to require extensive citation. See generally Robbins &
Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal
Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 893 (1977).
164. See Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (challenging confinement conditions where sixteen detainees had been confined in windowless cell designed to hold
six), vacated in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). In Medina,
state action was established under a public function theory; a close nexus theory could have been
used, however, because the government would have significant influence over the conditions of the
facility even though a private entity operated it.
165. See Ancata v. Prison Health Seres., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 702 (11th Cir. 1985) (challenging improper medical diagnosis and treatment). The court in Ancata used a public function analysis to find state action and believed that the state's involvement in this area of prisoners' rights
was well settled. Id. at 703. State action also could have been found under a close nexus test,
because the treatment of inmates is the state's obligation and because the state has control over
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that belong to the government, in spite of the delegation of operation to
a private entity. 1 6 State action will thus be found for conduct in these
areas and others affecting the inmates under a multi-characterization
analysis, even if it is the private party that engages in the conduct.2' 7
Unlike the claims of inmates, the claims of a private entity's employees against the government may not fit easily within a Frazier
analysis. Although the government may fund and regulate the private
entity, it is not responsible for and does not control or influence decisions or conduct regarding the entity's employees to the same extent
that it regulates and is responsible for the treatment of inmates and the
conditions of their confinement.
CONCLUSION

One argument in favor of prison privatization has been that it will
eliminate, or at least reduce, government liability. This argument does
not withstand examination. State action can be found in the private
prison context under any of the various tests-public function, close
nexus, state compulsion, and multi-characterization. Although the Supreme Court has increasingly restricted the application of the state action doctrine, with many lower federal courts following suit, the doctrine is certainly flexible enough to be used with vigor in the "right"
case, such as one involving a private prison. Indeed, to lessen liability in
the private prison context would be to curtail accountability. Common
sense tells us that, if we delegate the incarceration function to private
hands, we would want just the opposite to occur. As Justice Brennan
has written in a different context,' "[t]he Government is free. . . to
'privatize' some functions it would otherwise perform. But such privathe policies and regulations governing this area and therefore the challenged conduct.
166. See supra note 150 (recognizing that state cannot sidestep its constitutional obligations
through delegation).

167. Under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, respectively, the states must protect against cruel and unusual punishment and must protect a prisoner's
due process and equal protection rights. US. CONsr.amends. VIII & XIV. In addition, the state
controls parole decisions and sets standards for review. Conduct in these areas will be considered
state action. See, e.g., Mayer, Legal Issues SurroundingPrivate Operation of Prisons,22 CUbM.
L. BuLL 309, 319-20 (1986) (suggesting that, to avoid potential legal consequences, state might
retain control over prison disciplinary proceedings and decisions). See generally Note, Inmates*
Rights and the Privatizationof Prisons, 86 COLUM. L REV. 1475, 1484-99 (1986).
168. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971,
2984-87 (1987) (holding that the fact that Congress granted a corporate charter to the United
States Olympic Committee does not render that Committee a government actor to whom the fifth
amendment applies).
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tization ought not automatically release those who perform government
functions from constitutional obligations. 1 6 9 If there is a benefit to be
gained from prison privatization, therefore, it will have to come in some
17 0
other form.
POSTSCRIPT

After this article went to press, the United States Supreme Court,
on June 20, 1988, decided West v. Atkins.17 The Court addressed the
question "whether a physician who is under contract with the State to
provide medical services to inmates at a state-prison hospital on a parttime basis acts 'under color of state law,' within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, when he treats an inmate."11 2 Presenting no major surprises for state-action jurisprudence, the Court answered the question
in the affirmative, concluding that "respondent's delivery of medical
treatment to West was state action fairly attributable to the State
"173

Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court on the stateaction question,1 74 found "unpersuasive"' 75 the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Polk County v. Dodson,17 in which the Supreme Court held in
169. Id. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 149 (1988) ("Prisons remain subject to the supervision and regulation of the government-and, most important,
subject to the rule of law-whether they are run by government employees or by a private
agency.").
170. 1 do not intend to argue here the wisdom of prison privatization. Some of my views on
that question have been addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Robbins, Privatization of Corrections:
Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE 324 (1986).
171. 56 U.S.L.W. 4664 (U.S. June 20, 1988); see supra note 84 (discussing Fourth Circuit's
en banc opinion in West).
172. 56 U.S.L.W. at 4665.
173. Id. kt 4668.
174. Justice Scalia wrote a one-paragraph concurring opinion, noting that the lower courts
had construed West's pro se allegation of inadequate medical attention as claiming an eighth
amendment violation. Justice Scalia instead saw a due process claim:
I agree with the opinion of the Court that respondent acted under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983. I do not believe that a doctor who lacks supervisory or other
penological duties can inflict "punishment" within the meaning of that term in the Eighth
Amendment. . . .I am also of the view, however, that a physician who acts on behalf of
the State to provide needed medical attention to a person involuntarily in state custody
(in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from otherwise obtaining it, and who causes physical harm to such a person by deliberate indifference, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process.
Id. at 4668-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
175. Id. at 4667.
176. 454 U.S. 312 (1981); see supra note 67 (discussing Polk County).
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1981 that a public defender's activities or functions did not constitute
state action because public defenders were in an adversarial relationship with the state and because the state had not developed the professional standards that govern a lawyer's conduct. "In contrast to the
public defender," Justice Blackmun wrote, "Doctor Atkins' professional
and ethical obligation to make independent medical judgments, did not
set him in conflict with the State and other prison authorities. Indeed,
his relationship with other prison authorities was cooperative." 1" Justice Blackmun stressed that the Fourth Circuit had "misread Polk
County as establishing the general principle that professionals do not
act under color of state law when they act in their professional
178
capacities":
The [Fourth Circuit] considered a professional not to be subject to suit under § 1983 unless he was exercising "custodial
or supervisory" authority. .

. To the extent this Court in

Polk County relied on the fact that the public defender is a
"professional" in concluding that he was not engaged in state
action, the case turned on the particular professional obligation of the criminal defense attorney to be an adversary of the
State, not on the independence and
integrity generally appli17 9
cable to professionals as a class.
This distinction leaves little, if any, room for applying Polk
County's restrictive state-action holding to providers of other services.
Concluding on this point, Justice Blackmun stated: "Defendants are
not removed from the purview of § 1983 simply because they are professionals acting in accordance with professional discretion and judgment."' 80 Further, the Court attached no importance to the fact that
Dr. Atkins was a contractor, rather than an employee of the state
177. 56 U.S.L.W. at 4666-67.
178. Id. at 4667.
179.

Id.

180. Id. The Court did suggest, however, that professional discretion and judgment were not
"entirely irrelevant to the state-action inquiry. Where the issue is whether a private party is cagaged in activity that constitutes state action, it may be relevant that the challenged activity
turned on judgments controlled by professional standards, where those standards are not established by the State." Id. at 4667 n.10 (emphasis in original). Citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), Justice Blackmun indicated that
the requisite "nexus" with the state must be present for state action to exist. 56 U.S.LW. at 4667
n.10; see supra notes 100-136 and accompanying text (discussing close-nexus test in private-parson context); see also supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text (discussing state-compulsion
test in private-prison context).
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prison system:
It is the physician's function within the state system, not the
precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his
actions can be fairly attributable to the State. Whether a physician is on the state payroll or is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship
among the State, the phy81 1
sician, and the prisoner.
Thus, if there was any ambiguity concerning the application of
state-action doctrine to private prisons before West, the Supreme Court
has eliminated it: State action will clearly exist in the prison-privatization context. Although West v. Atkins provides little insight into the
precise test to be used in state-action analysis, the case is significant in
the way in which it distinguishes and restricts Polk County v. Dodson.
West is also significant because some of its language, albeit in the medical context, corresponds precisely to that used at the conclusion of this
1 82
article:
Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State
of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's
prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment
rights. The State bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to West; the State delegated that function
to respondent Atkins; and respondent voluntarily assumed that
obligation by contract. 83
If state action is present when the state contracts out its obligation to
perform one service, then state action is certainly present when the government contracts out the entire operation of a prison facility.

181. 56 U.S.L.W. at 4668.
182. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
183. 56 U.S.L.W. at 4668.

